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THE FUTURE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT's
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS EXEMPTION AND DISCLOSURE
OF COMPUTERIZED FEDERAL RECORDS AFTER
Petroleum Information Corp. v.
United States Department of the Interior
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")l to pro-
vide a true governmental records disclosure statute. 2 FOIA mandated the
availability of federal records to any member of the public, subject to nine
broad exemptions.3 The fifth of these nine exemptions protects "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be avail-
able by law.., to a party in litigation with the agency" ("Exemption 5").4
Courts have construed Exemption 5 to mean that an agency is permitted
to withhold information associated with its deliberative, or decision-mak-
ing, process.
5
Since the enactment of FOIA, the deliberative process privilege ex-
emption has been heavily litigated.6 In Petroleum Information Corp. v. United
States Department of the Interior,7 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
held that computerized records of the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM"), a division of United States Department of Interior, were not pro-
tected by Exemption 5 because of the objective nature of the records and
the unreasonable accessibility to the records in another form.8 This deci-
sion is important in its recognition of the right of public citizens to obtain
computerized agency records already available in a non-computerized for-
mat. This Comment discusses FOIA's deliberative process privilege, re-
views how courts have treated the privilege, and analyzes the impact of
Petroleum on the future of the privilege and the ability to obtain electronic
information under FOIA.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CAN.
2418.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988).
5. See, e.g., Dudman Communications Corp. v. Department of Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565,
1567 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6. Se I JAMES T. O'RLLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DiscLosuRE, § 15.01 (2d ed. 1990).
7. 976 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
8. I
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I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT'S DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
Congress originally conceived FOIA as a revision of Section 3, the
public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act.9 The legis-
lature recognized that Section 3 fell far short of its disclosure goals and
considered it to be more of a withholding statute than a disclosure stat-
ute.1 0 Under FOIA, an agency can potentially avoid disclosure by assert-
ing that the requested documents fall under one of the nine statutory
exemptions. Exemption 5 permits the withholding of documents gener-
ated within an agency or transferred between agencies that are not avail-
able to a party in litigation with the agency.11 Courts have viewed
Exemption 5's language as "somewhat Delphic"12 and "obscure."13 Many
decisions thus relied on legislative history for interpretation of Exemption
5.14 Although the documents comprising the legislative history of FOIA
were voluminous, a leading commentator stated that a ten-page Senate
committee report and a fourteen-page House committee report consti-
tuted the substantial useful information on the legislative intent behind
FOIA. 5
Both the Senate report 16 and the House report 17 were favorable on
the passage of FOIA. The general theme of both reports was that Con-
gress intended to incorporate the government's common law discovery
and executive privileges into Exemption 5.18 The House report leaned
toward nondisclosure in its remarks that agencies should release only that
information "routinely" available to private parties in litigation with agen-
cies, and Exemption 5 should protect documents which the agency has
received or generated before it completes the process of making a deci-
9. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964); seeS. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966) 3 [hereinaf-
ter S. Rep. No. 813] (discussing why Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act needed
revision).
10. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (citing S. Rep. No. 813 at 5).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) states that FOLA does not apply to "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with an agency."
12. Department of Justice v.Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
13. City of W. Chicago v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F. Supp. 740,
747 (N.D. 11. 1982); see also Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d
1429, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (recognizing the "slippery" application of Exemption 5); Parke,
Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1980) ("It is much easier to state the purpose
of Exemption 5 than to apply it").
14. See, e.g., Julian, 486 U.S. at 12; Mink, 410 U.S. at 83; Petrleum, 976 F.2d at 1434;
Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1183 (5th Cir. 1978); SDC Dev. Corp. v. Ma-
thews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. Kenneth C. Davis, The Information Act: A Prdiminay Analysis, 34 U. CI. L. REy. 761,
762 (1966-67). At least three Supreme Court FOIA decisions, NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975),Julian 486 U.S. at 17-18 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and United
States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 n.19
(1989), have cited Professor Davis' article.
16. See generaly S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9.
17. H.R. RaP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CA.N.
2418.
18. See id.; see generaly S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9.
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sion. 19 The Senate committee's remarks, on the other hand, emphasized
that exemptions to disclosure should be construed as narrowly as possi-
ble.2 0 Virtually all of the courts which have reviewed the difference be-
tween the two reports have stated that the Senate report represents the
truer indication of Congress' purpose in enacting Exemption 5.21 Despite
the conflicting language in the two reports, courts have cited both because
they clearly identify Congress' intent to address the need to maintain an
environment within agencies in which candid discussions can take place.
22
The Supreme Court has construed Exemption 5 to mean that the
public is entitled to all documents which would be discoverable by a pri-
vate party in litigation with an agency.23 However, differentiating between
discoverable and privileged material is not always easy.24 The Court has
not interpreted Exemption 5 to clearly incorporate every civil discovery
privilege.2 5 Because of the uncertainty inherent in the rules governing
discovery, the Court has held that discovery rules should be applied in
FOIA cases only by "rough analogies." 26
The deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases.2 7 First,
the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency.2 8 Second, it
prevents public confusion which would result from premature disclosure
of agency opinions occurring before the agency establishes final policy. 29
Third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision because the public
should notjudge officials based on the information they considered prior
to issuing their final decisions.
30
In order for a record to qualify for Exemption 5 under the delibera-
tive process privilege, it must meet a two prong test of being both "predeci-
sional," or created prior to the adoption of agency policy, and
"deliberative," or actually related to the process by which the policy was
developed.3 1 These two requirements recognize that the primary purpose
of the privilege is to protect the confidentiality of the process by which an
agency makes governmental decisions.
3 2
19. Davis, supra note 15, at 763; see H.R. RF,. No. 1497, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CAN. at
2428. But see Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354-55 (1979) (finding it
unclear whether Exemption 5 intended to incorporate every civil discovery privilege and
courts should be hesitant in construing Exemption 5 to incorporate a civil discovery privilege
which would duplicate another FOIA exemption).
20. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 9.
21. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1141 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (and cases cited
therein); see alsoJordan v. Department ofJustice, 591 F.2d 753, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating
that the language of the House Report is "less consonant" with the purpose of FOIA).
22. 1 BURT A. BRAvEaMAN & FwAcasJ. CHETWY, INFORMATION LAw § 9-2 (1985).
23. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
24. Id. at 87-89.
25. Mer,iU 443 U.S. at 354.
26. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86.
27. Jordan, 591 F.2d at 772.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 772-73.
30. Id. at 773.
31. Id. at 774.
32. National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.
1988); see also S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, which states:
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF DELIBERATWE PRIVILEGE CASE LAw
A. Factual vs. Deliberative
Early FOIA decisions involving agencies that claimed the deliberative
process privilege dwelled on whether the information was factual or delib-
erative, the latter consisting primarily of the opinions and recommenda-
tions of agency officials.33 Under this factual-deliberative distinction,
agencies could withhold deliberative information, but had to disclose fac-
tual information.34 In EPA v. Mink,3 5 the Supreme Court reasoned that
the release of factual information would not harm the consultative pur-
poses that the privilege of nondisclosure protects. 36 However, agencies
could not withhold factual data merely by placing it in an opinion.3 7 To
the extent that the agency could excise factual data from the document
without compromising the confidential remainder of the document, the
agency must disclose the factual information.3 8 Beginning with Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice,3 9 decisions soon recog-
nized that the factual-deliberative distinction did not work in all cases.
40
In Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy,4 1 D.C. CircuitJudge Wald
held that the deliberative process privilege did not exempt documents
merely because they were deliberative on their face; the documents had to
also somehow reflect the "give-and-take" by which an agency made its deci-
It was argued, and with merit, that efficiency of Government would be greatly ham-
pered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all Government agencies were
prematurely forced to "operate in a fishbowl." The committee is convinced of the
merits of this general proposition, but it has attempted to delimit the exception as
narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.
I at 9.
33. See, e.g., Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88; Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C.
Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
34. See Mink, 410 U.S. at 90.
35. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
36. See i& at 88. In Mink, Congresswoman Patsy Mink and 32 other members of the
House commenced an action under FOIA to seek release of recommendations to President
Nixon regarding the advisability of scheduled underground nuclear tests. Id at 75-76. The
EPA argued that the recommendations were protected under Exemption 5 because they
were prepared for the sole purpose of advising the President. Id. at 77.
37. Id. at 92.
38. 1I The court of appeals directed the trial court to order an in camera inspection of
the materials to determine if any factual material could be severed and disclosed. I& at 93.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that if the EPA could demonstrate by affidavit or
testimony that the materials sought were purely advisory and contained no factual informa-
tion which could be severed, an in camera inspection of the documents was not "automatic."
I& at 93.
39. 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
40. 1I The court warned that, although the factual-deliberative test could offer a quick
and predictable rule for decision, "courts must be careful not to be victims of their own
semantics." I at 256. The court stated that in some situations the disclosure of purely fac-
tual matter could expose the agency's decision-making process. Thus, the court rejected
Mead Data Central's argument that the documents sought were "reportorial and factual"
because the documents only provided summaries of discussions among Air Force personnel
regarding negotiations between the Air Force and West Publishing and did not set out rec-
ommendations or opinions. The court stated that such summaries of discussions were as
much a part of the deliberative process as the actual recommendations based on the negotia-
tions. I at 257; see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
41. 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 71:3
PETROLEUM INFORMATION CORPORATION
sion.4 2 Conversely, documents apparently factual sometimes revealed a
lot about the agency's decision-making process. 43 Thus, less emphasis was
placed on the kind of documents sought and more on the effect of the
documents' disclosure. 44 The determinative question in Exemption 5
cases then became whether the release of material would expose the
agency's deliberative process in such a way as to harm candid discussions
and thereby harm the ability of agencies to function effectively.
45
B. Predecisional vs. Postdecisional
Courts also began to differentiate between predecisional and
postdecisional documents when interpreting FOIA.46 Deliberation is a
process which works toward a future decision, and the additional require-
ment that material must be predecisional seemed superfluous. 47 How-
ever, as set forth in Access Reports v. Department ofJustice,48 an "after-the-fact
explanation" of an agency's decision may be deliberative, but because
Congress did not intend to exempt such "explanatory" information from
FOIA, the privilege will be denied if the court finds that the documents
were not predecisional. 4 9 Concerns arose that if agencies did not have to
disclose explanations of their final decisions, they could develop a body of
"secret law."5 0 The Coastal States court reasoned that postdecisional inter-
pretations are a part of the agency's law itself, and agencies should make
42. Id. at 866 (holding that Exemption 5 covers "recommendations, draft documents,
proposals, suggestions and other subjective documents" that suggest an agency position
which may be only a personal opinion of the agency's position); see a/so Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that just because a document contains recom-
mendations from a subordinate to a superior does not make the document deliberative; the
court must know whether the document is a requisite part of the deliberative process or
simply a "peripheral item which just 'beefs up' a position with cumulative materials");
Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that the evaluative sec-
tions of the reports which the government maintained were shielded from disclosure and
only provided the "raw data upon which decisions [could] be made; they were not themselves
a part of the decisional process").
43. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n, 610 F.2d at 83; Washington Research Project, Inc. v. De-
partment of HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491
F.2d 63, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. Dudman Communications Corp. v. Department of Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
45. Id.
46. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1975) (and cases cited
therein).
47. Access Reports v. Department of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
48. Id.
49. Id. However, Judge Williams dismissed Access Reports' argument that the requested
document was not predecisional because the Department ofJustice could not "pinpoint" its
contents to a later decision. Judge Williams found that the Department of Justice memo
superficially resembled a postdecisional explanation of an agency decision because it ana-
lyzed amendments to FOIA proposed by the Department ofJustice and already introduced in
the Senate. However, the memo was found exempt because the Department ofJustice met
its burden of identifying the decisionmaking process contained in the memo, which was the
Department ofJustice's study of how to push the FOIA amendments through Congress. Id.
at 1196.
50. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
1994]
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them available to the public. 51 For example, if a company has a case
heard before the FTC, the company has a right to know the orders and
interpretations which the FTC has actually applied to prior cases before
it.5
2
Since the passage of FOIA, courts have had difficulty applying the
two-part test because neither the factual-deliberative test nor the predeci-
sional-postdecisional test offers a clear-cut analysis. Recent cases involving
factual material requested under FOIA illustrated this point as courts held
that census statistics,53 cost estimates5 4 and summaries of facts gleaned
from a voluminous hearing record5 5 were all protected by Exemption 5.
Regarding the predecisional component, the Coastal court noted that case
law was not too helpful in deciding whether documents were predecisional
because the deliberative process privilege was so dependent upon the par-
ticular document and its role in the decision-making process.5 6 The court
found the Department of Energy had adopted a particular policy even
though it argued that the source of the policy was contained in a draft
document. 57 The court held that such a document lost its privileged sta-
tus because the Department of Energy adopted the policy.
58
C. D.C. Circuit Treatment of the Deliberative Process Privilege
Since the passage of FOIA, the D.C. Circuit has delivered more FOIA
decisions than any other circuit.5 9 During the late seventies and early
eighties, the D.C. Circuit was known for its pro-disclosure stance in decid-
ing FOIA cases, 60 but beginning in the mid-eighties, the court began in-
creasing the range of the deliberative process privilege in requests
involving factual information. 6 1 Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human
Services,62 Quarles v. Department of Nasyf3 and Dudman Communications Corp.
51. Id. at 867-68 (citing Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
52. See Sterling Drug, 450 F.2d at 714.
53. Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941,
950 (11th Cir. 1992).
54. Quarles v. Department of Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
55. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 86 (2d Cir. 1979).
56. Coastal States, 617 F,2d at 867.
57. See id. at 866; cf. City of W. Chicago v. NRC, 547 F. Supp. 740, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(holding that an affidavit which described the process of "give and take" needed to polish
unpublished drafts of an environmental impact statement which would later be published
established the statement's predecisional status).
58. Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 869. The Department of Energy memoranda here were
routinely used by agency staff in conducting audits and were kept and "referred to as prece-
dent." Id. If this occurs, Judge Wald reasoned, the agency has "promulgated a body of secret
law which it is actually applying in its dealings with the public." Id. The Department of
Energy then could not attempt to protect such memoranda behind a "tentative opinion"
label. Id.
59. See Patricia M. Wald,... Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief" 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv.




62. 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
63. 893 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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v. Department of the Air Force6 4 are illustrative of this approach by the D.C.
Circuit to increase the range of the deliberative process privilege.
In Wolfe, where five of the eleven judges dissented, Judge Bork, writ-
ing for the majority, held that a log containing the dates that the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services received and forwarded regulatory
proposals was exempt because the dates would reveal the proposals prema-
turely.65 As Judge Wald pointed out in her dissent, however, the log only
disclosed dates and the destination of the proposals. 66 The information
neither disclosed the desired effect of the proposal nor the origin of any
decision not to regulate. 67 Judge Wald found that the log was not deliber-
ative because it did not even show a clear "yes" or "no" recommendation,
let alone any substantive language regarding the regulation. 68 Judge Wald
characterized the majority opinion as exaggerating the effect of the log on
agency deliberations and confusing the purpose of Exemption 5.69 Addi-
tionally, Judge Ginsburg noted in her dissent that the majority opinion
strayed from the legislative intent behind the deliberative process privi-
lege, which was to construe the privilege "as narrowly as possible."
70
In Quarles, the plaintiff characterized Navy cost estimates of building
ports as fact, and argued that disclosure would not harm the Navy.7 1 The
plaintiff relied on two cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits which ruled
that real property appraisals were disclosable. 72 Although the two cases
had special features which made them distinguishable, 73 the Quarles court
stated that appraisals seemed to involve "fewer judgment calls than esti-
mates of what construction will cost."7 4 The court also contended that if
the cost estimates were made public, naval officials might tend not to call
for cost estimates or to fudge such estimates. 75 The opinion also discussed
how disclosure of cost estimates could threaten public acceptance of the
Navy's final decision because the Navy might end up building a port
which, although more expensive, was strategically superior. 76 However,
this kind of information was precisely what the public had a right to seek.
If ports were being built for purely political reasons, as Quarles con-
tended, agencies should not be able to hide behind excuses that to dis-
64. 815 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
65. Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 775.
66. Id. at 777.
67. Id.
68. Id at 779.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 780 (quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 9).
71. Quares, 893 F.2d at 392-93.
72. Id. at 393 (citing General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969) and Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972)).
73. In Benson, a statute which required disclosure in the absence of a compelling reason
was a deciding factor for the court. 415 F.2d at 880. In Tennessean Newspapers, FHA had
already disclosed the content of the appraisal, withholding only the appraiser's name. 464
F.2d at 662.
74. Quares, 893 F.2d at 393.
75. Id. at 393.
76. Seeid.
1994]
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close such information would produce "stillborn or wishy-washy"
analyses.
77
The Dudman court relied heavily on a prior decision, Russell v. Depart-
ment of the Air Force,78 to hold that a draft manuscript of an Air Force his-
torical work containing factual matter was exempt under the deliberative
process privilege. 79 In Russell, the draft sought differed from the docu-
ment released to the public only because it contained 20 pages of factual
material which the Air Force decided to delete in the final version. 80
Therefore, the court found that a simple comparison of the draft and final
documents would reveal the editorial decision the Air Force made and
thus held that such a decision was exempted by the deliberative process
privilege. 8 1 In Dudman, on the other hand, the historical manuscript at
issue was revised numerous times before it was made public. 82 Dudman
only sought the initial draft prepared by Riley Sunderland.83 After the Air
Force became dissatisfied with Sunderland's work, Martin Blumenson was
hired to "substantially" rework the manuscript. 8 4 Dudman contended
that, unlike the document at issue in Russell the Sunderland draft was
materially different from the final manuscript. The draft document then
could not arguably provide any clue as to agency deliberations in editing
the work. 85 And even though the court acknowledged that any person
comparing the Sunderland draft to the final manuscript would find it im-
possible to attribute any given change to a particular person or particular
stage in the editorial process, the Sunderland draft was held exempt.
86
Against this increasingly broadened scope of Exemption 5 case law, in
1992 the D.C. Circuit decided Petroleum Information Corp. v. United States
Department of the Interioi8 7 and found that an agency could not shield a
"draft" database from disclosure. 88
III. PETROLE'M INFORMATION CORP. V. UArIED STA =S DE&PARTAU'r OF
T-E INTF- OR
A. Facts
The BLM maintains more than one billion paper documents con-
cerning the 340 million acres of federally owned lands and 750 million
acres of federal mining holdings which it manages.89 In 1982, the BLM
began a lengthy process of developing the Automated Land and Mineral
77. Id.
78. 682 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
79. Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569.
80. Russell 682 F.2d at 1049.
81. Id.
82. Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569.
83. Id. at 1567.
84. 1d. at 1569.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1439 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1431.
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Record Systems Project ("ALMRS"), a computerized database containing
files and records currently available to the public in paper form.90 The
ALMRS contains three main files: (1) the Legal Land Description File
("LLD"), which provides information about BLM property such as its de-
scription, location, relevant political unit and administering agency; (2)
the Mining Claims Recordation System ("MCRS"), which records and
tracks mining claims; and (3) the Case Recordation System ("CRS"),
which records and tracks oil and gas leases.9 1 At the time of the court's
decision, the LLD was more complete than the MCRS or the CRS, but the
BLM had not planned to release any information in the ALMRS to the
public until all three data files were complete.
9 2
The LLD file was created to convert graphic representations con-
tained in Master Title Plats, 93 planimetric maps and surveys, as well as nar-
rative information contained in original patents and survey documents,
into 17 categories of information about a particular parcel of land which
are represented on a computer screen as alphanumeric codes.94 The
BLM contended that its selection of these data elements could change
prior to completion of the LLD file and the LLD's file integration into the
ALMRS system. 95 The BLM also emphasized that creation of the LLD file
involved considerably more work than simply converting the paper files
into computerized records.96 When source documents contained conflict-
ing or incomplete information on a parcel of land, BLM staff who com-
piled the information had to revise the record and exercise discretion in
doing so, because the BLM expects that the ALMRS will adjust previously
incorrect property rights.
97
Between 1987 and 1989, Plaintiff, Petroleum Information Corpora-
tion ("Petroleum"), a supplier of oil and gas exploration and production
information, contracted with the BLM to collect and input the informa-
tion regarding property in several Western states for the LLD file. 98 As
provided by its contracts with the BLM, Petroleum had access to magnetic
computer tapes containing the LLD files for those states. However, the




93. Master Title Plats are sets of manually prepared maps that depict land ownership
and uses within a township. Id.
94. Id. The seventeen categories were: "meridian, township, range, section, survey type,
survey number, survey suffix, aliquot part, acreage, survey note, state, county, congressional
district, BLM district, resource area, planning unit and administrative agency." I. at 1431-32
n. 1.
95. Id. at 1432.
96. Id.
97. Id. Along with the existing CRS and MCRS files, the Status file and the Geographic
Coordination Data Base ("GCDB"), two other new data bases, will be merged with the LLD
file. The Status file will contain information regarding the availability of different uses for a
given parcel of land, and "[t]he GCDB will graphically relate ownership and survey informa-
tion to physical points on the Earth's surface." Id. Both the Status and GCDB files will also
readjust previous incorrect property rights because the information from these two files will
be much more accurate. Id.
98. Id.
19941
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mation for the Status file in the LLD.99 The contracts also required Petro-
leum to return the LLD files to the BLM upon completion of data
collection and to not provide the files to anyone outside of the con-
tracts. 10 0 However, as the court noted, the contracts apparently did not
bar Petroleum from obtaining through FOIA what was prohibited in the
contracts.1 0
In March, 1989, Petroleum requested under FOIA a copy of the
BLM's computer tape which included part of the LLD file for Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota and Wyoming. 0 2 The request sought LLD data
relating to the "description, location, surface administrative agency, polit-
ical unit and acreage" of BLM property in those states.103 Apparently, Pe-
troleum intended to sell the information to its oil and gas customers.'
0 4
The BLM refused Petroleum's FOIA request. The BLM claimed that the
data was protected by the deliberative process privilege contained in Ex-
emption 5.105 After waiting more than five months for a decision on its
administrative appeal, Petroleum filed suit.10 6 On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the BLM argued for the information's protection under
FOIA's deliberative process privilege because of the LLD file's unfinished
"draft" status. 10 7 The district court found that the data sought by Petro-
leum was completely factual and "neither predecisional nor delibera-
tive." 10 8 The district court emphasized the data's lack of any decisional
component.'09 Also, the district court judge did not find that BLM staff-
ers' work of verifying the records' accuracy resembled the "give-and-take"
of ideas among employees which is characteristic of the deliberative pro-
cess Exemption 5 seeks to protect." 0 The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of Petroleum."' The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit affirmed, concluding that the LLD information requested was not
shielded by the deliberative process privilege.
112
B. Holding
The district court's decision rested on three main points." 3 First, the





103. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 89-3173, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17137 at *1-2 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1990).
104. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1432.
105. Id See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973), for an explanation of Exemption 5.
106. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1432.
107. Id
108. Petroleum 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17137 at *8.
109. Id
110. Id (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
111. Id. at *10.
112. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1431 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
113. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 89-3173, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17137 at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1990).
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ing any decisional character, and fell easily into the factual exclusion to
Exemption 5, articulated by the Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink 114 Sec-
ond, the district court found that none of the BLM's reasons for claiming
the exemption, i.e., the compilation of the LLD, its draft status, its merg-
ing into the ALMRS data base, or its verification by the BLM employees, in
any way resembled the "give-and-take" of ideas which characterizes the Ex-
emption 5 deliberative process privilege. 1 15 And third, the district court
noted that the BLM's nondisclosure of the LLD file would increase the
scope of Exemption 5 beyond congressional intent.
1 16
The court of appeals first addressed whether the material was factual
versus subjective. It found that the LLD file contained technical and objec-
tive material and was thus factual in content.' 1 7 The court of appeals also
affirmed the district court's second finding that the process by which the
BLM created the LLD was not deliberative.18 Because the appellate court
found that the LLD file was not deliberative, it did not find it necessary to
also decide whether the data was predecisional. 119 Judge Ginsburg stated
that the task of creating the LLD file here differed greatly from other situ-
ations in which agency functions were held deliberative.' 20 She character-
ized the BLM's task as merely rearranging a large collection of data.'
21
This was different from where an agency selectively compiled material
from a sizable hearing transcript, which, if disclosed, would show the
agency's deliberative process in deciding which information was rele-
vant.' 22 The court of appeals also found that BLM employees' duties to
make acreage estimates where the source documents were incomplete or
inaccurate may have been time-consuming, but did not involve the kind of
discretion which the deliberative process demands. 123 Judge Ginsburg
also dismissed the BLM's argument that revealing the current data ele-
ments could harm its ultimate choice of such data elements.' 24 The data
code and format choices were not the kinds of decisions which, if re-
vealed, would hamper candid communication within an agency or cause
public confusion. 12 5 The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's
114. Id. at *6-7 (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-91 (1973)).
115. Id. at *9 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,
866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
116. Id. at *9.
117. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1438.
118. Id.
119. 1& at 1436 n.9.
120. I&
121. Id. at 1438.
122. Id. at 1434-35.
123. Id. (citing Quarles v. Department of Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
124. Id. at 1438-39.
125. Id. (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866
(D.C.Cir. 1980)). An interesting aside about the court's determination that revealing the
choice of data elements was not deliberative was that the court stated twice in its opinion that
nothing prevented the BLM from attaching a warning to the LLD file that the file was unfin-
ished and subject to change. PetroLeum, 976 F.2d at 1439. However, in the district court
opinion, the BLM claimed that attaching a warning would not effectively prevent public con-
fusion. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 89-3173, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17137 at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1990).
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third factor in awarding summary judgment to Petroleum, in reiterating
the goal of FOIA which calls for broad disclosure and narrow construction
of its exemptions.
126
The BLM also raised the argument that the LLD file should be ex-
empt as "confidential commercial information" protected by rule 26(c) (7)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under Federal Open Market Commit-
tee of the Federal Reserve System v. MerrilL12 7 In MeriI the Supreme Court
held that Exemption 5 included a privilege for confidential commercial
information, at least to the extent that the information is produced by the
government in the process by which the government decides to award a
contract. 128 The appellate court found that the BLM did not show that
the LLD file was either commercial or confidential. 12 9 Also, the LLD file
was not created in any way for a decision by the BLM to award a con-
tract.'3 0 Thus, the court of appeals found the BLM's argument under
Merrill without merit.
1 31
Bound by the same D.C. Circuit standard of review for FOIA cases
which is applicable generally to summary judgments under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,1 32 the court of appeals decided, in viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the BLM, that there remained no
genuine issue of material fact.133 In performing that review, Judge Gins-
burg stated that it is the agency's burden in FOIA cases to show that the
requested material falls within a FOIA exemption. 13 4 Since the BLM
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that creation of the LLD file
impacted on the kind of policy judgments Exemption 5 was enacted to
protect, summary judgment in favor of Petroleum was appropriate.
13 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE OPINION
A. Creation of the LLD File Lacked Deliberative Qualities
Notwithstanding the non-disclosure trend in the D.C. Circuit's recent
decisions, the Petroleum court looked at two prominent features of the LLD
file to decide that it was not deliberative.13 6 First, the court emphasized
the current public availability of the records in a paper formatL13 7 The
court distinguished Dismukes v. Department of Interior,138 which involved a
comparable request for BLM records, because in Dismukes identical data
was available in alternate formats. 139 The court found that the instant
126. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1439.
127. 443 U.S. 340 (1979).
128. Merri/! 443 U.S. at 360.
129. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1439.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
133. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1439.
134. Id at 1433.
135. See id at 1439.
136. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1436-38.
137. Id at 1436.
138. 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
139. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1437 n.ll.
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case did not involve "twice-recorded information" as in Dismukes because
BLM personnel testified that the difficulty in amassing the information
prevented Petroleum from obtaining the requested information in a "rea-
sonably accessible form."14° The court relied on Tax Analysts v. United
States Department ofJustice14 1 in holding that Petroleum could not be penal-
ized for trying to avoid the difficulty which the BLM went through in put-
ting together the LLD file.
14 2
The court's decision to allow Petroleum to obtain the records on
computer tapes, notwithstanding their availability on paper, addressed but
did not entirely resolve a serious concern of FOIA requesters who seek
access to the increasing amount of government records which have be-
come computerized.1 43 This concern centers on the FOIA requester's
ability to obtain the computerized version of data that is also available in
another format. Petroleum addressed the concern that if information is not
reasonably available in a format other than computerized records, an
agency must provide the computerized records. Yet Petroleum did not re-
solve situations where an agency can successfully argue that the data is
reasonably accessible and identically reproduced on paper. Since Petro-
leum did not overrule Dismukes, an agency can still withhold computerized
data if the data is identically reproduced and easily accessible on paper or
another non-computerized format. However, as governmental databases
become larger and more complex with programs which provide quick ac-
cess to thousands of records, Dismukes situations may become less fre-
quent. Agencies may have a difficult time proving that access to the paper
records is reasonable when sifting through paper documents for informa-
tion involves considerably more time and manual effort than searching for
the same information via a computerized index.
The second principal characteristic which guided the court in finding
that the BLM must disclose the computer tapes to Petroleum was that the
information was not associated with an important policy decision.1 4 4 The
court found the task of creating the ALMRS was "essentially technical and
facilitative." 14 5 The court then carefully distinguished the other D.C. Cir-
cuit cases which have held that agencies' deliberative processes involving
factual information were privileged. The court noted the information's
dissimilarity with both the political concerns in deciding the location of
navy ports in Quarles and the interpretation of historical events in Rus-
140. Id.
141. 845 F.2d 1060, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aftd, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (holding that Tax
Analysts' request to obtain from the Department of Justice information for its electronic
database regarding recent tax court cases must be honored by the Department because the
information sought constituted agency records in the Department's possession).
142. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1437.
143. Id. From the time FOIA was drafted until 1986, the amount of mainframe com-
puters employed by agencies has increased almost ten-fold. Microcomputers were not used
at the time of FOIA's creation; in 1986, over 125,000 were in use. Agency budgets for infor-
mation technology increased from $9.2 billion to $15 million in just four years. SeeJamie A.
Grodsky, The Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute is not User Friendly, 31
JURIrmETRcsJ. 17, 18 (1990).
144. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1437.
145. Id.
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sell'14 6 The court found the task of transferring in full the public source
documents into the LLD file was unlike Montrose Chemical where a great
quantity of information was selectively summarized.
147
Judge Ginsburg also found the BLM's argument that employees
would have to estimate acreage because of inaccurate source documents
did not personify the judgmental cost estimates made in Quarks.148 How-
ever, the Quarks court's statement that appraisals involve fewer judgment
calls than estimates of what construction will cost seemed overly broad.
An appraisal of unique property, for example, would involve a considera-
ble amount ofjudgment and opinion. Similarly, the Quarles court's asser-
tions that cost estimates derived from a "complex set of judgments" and
consisted of "just that elasticity that has persuaded courts to provide shel-
ter for opinions generally" 149 seemed overreaching. An official's prepara-
tion of cost estimates meant reviewing the cost of building similar
facilities. This comparison process did not involve the "give-and-take" of
agency decision-making which has characterized deliberative process privi-
lege cases.
Finally, Judge Ginsburg did not find that releasing the unfinished
LLD file to Petroleum would compromise the BLM's final choice of file
data elements. 150 The court did not see in the data element choices the
kind of decision which, if exposed, would inhibit candid discussions within
an agency, as stated in Coastal States.'
5 '
Although Petroleum will assist future FOIA requesters to obtain elec-
tronic data which is technical in nature, these requests may still be prob-
lematic if a database contains selected information from public records
because the Petroleum decision did not overrule Montrose Chemical Reques-
ters also may have difficulty obtaining computerized records where such
records contain any political cast because the Petroleum court distinguished
Quarles as noted above and because the court declined to side with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Assembly of California v. Department of Com-
merrce 52 finding that computer tapes containing solicited, but unused cen-
sus statistics were not exempt by the deliberative process privilege.' 53 The
Eleventh Circuit, in deciding the same set of facts, held that the census
tapes were exempt as "opinion" and emphasized the broad discretion the
Department of Commerce enjoyed in reporting census figures. 154 The Pe-
troleum court stated that the BLM data element choices were not as "broad
and politically charged" as those in the census tape decisions and thus
146. I&
147. Id. at 1438.
148. Petroleum, 976 F.2d 1429.
149. IM.; see Quarkes, 893 F.2d at 393-94.
150. Id
151. Id. at 1439.
152. 968 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. Petroleum. 976 F.2d at 1438 n.12 (citing Assembly of Cal. v. Department of Com-
merce, 968 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1992)).
154. Id at 1438 n.12 (citing Florida House of Representatives v. Department of Com-
merce, 961 F.2d 941, 950 (lth Cir. 1992)).
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found that those inconsistent decisions did not affect the outcome in the
instant case.
15 5
B. The Future of FOIA Requests for Computerized information After Petroleum
Although the D.C. Circuit decision allowed Petroleum to obtain the
computerized records, Judge Ginsburg was careful in crafting the decision
so as not to overstep the bounds placed on the court by precedent. How-
ever, whereas FOIA decisions in the D.C. Circuit were becoming more ex-
pansive in their application of Exemption 5 to all kinds of agency records
and decision-making processes, this decision represents a step in the right
direction. After Petroleum, a FOLA requester should be able to obtain elec-
tronic agency information in certain, well-defined situations, such as
where the information is technical and not reasonably accessible in an-
other format. However, the decision did not go far enough. As one com-
mentator noted, FOTA requesters like Petroleum which have the financial
resources and the time to pursue litigation under FOLA may succeed in
obtaining electronic information.' 5 6 However, for the general public
seeking computerized data on a daily basis, at least three problems
remain.
First, since FOLA does not directly define agency records to include
electronic information, courts are still deciding whether agencies must dis-
close computerized data.'5 7 Records exist not only on paper, but also on
computer tapes, diskettes, and other computer formats.158 Also, the
proliferation of personal computers with modems allows users a new way
to access computerized FOIA records.' 59 FOLA was conceived at a time
when virtually all records existed on paper,' 6° and the application of FOLA
to electronic information can be troublesome.' 61 Although agencies
clearly do not have to create records to meet FOLA requests, the legal
picture becomes cloudy when a court must decide what constitutes crea-
tion of a new record. 162 For example, in Yeager v. DEA,16 3 Yeager argued
155. Id.
156. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 47.
157. See Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization of Government Information: Does it Circumvent
Public Access under the Freedom of Information Act and the Depository Library Program?, 24 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBLEMS 267 (1991) (discussing how in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980),
the Court implied that electronic data constitute agency records because the Records Dispo-
sal Act specifically stated that the "physical storage format" of information does not deter-
mine whether the information is a record); see also Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that because the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to FOIA specifi-
cally discussed problems inherent in computerized information such as search and copying
fees, data tapes are agency records). But see SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1120
(9th Cir. 1976) (holding that MEDLARS' computerized information is not an agency record
within the meaning of FOIA).
158. Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age:
Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 543, 579 (1993).
159. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 44.
160. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63 TEMPLE L. REv. 201, 224
(1990).
161. Id.
162. Bunker, supra note 158, at 574.
163. 678 F.2d 315, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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that to require the DEA to use "compacting" software to release reasonably
segregable, nonexempt portions of criminal records did not result in the
creation of a new record. 64 Judge Tamm, writing for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, rejected this argument. 165 The court held
that FOIA did not contemplate creating a greater segregation duty for
agencies with computerized records than upon agencies where informa-
tion is retrieved manually.' 66 The Yeager court remained unpersuaded
that FOIA intended "any manipulation or restructuring of the substantive
content of a record when it commanded agencies to 'delete' exempt
information."
16 7
Second, as seen above, where the requested information exists in
both paper and electronic formats, and the paper format is reasonably
accessible, under Dismukes, the agency may avoid releasing the informa-
tion in an electronic format. Dismukes, however, misses the point because
FOIA has imposed duties on agencies to not only disclose records but also
to make them accessible to the public.16 By releasing the computerized
data in a non-computerized format, the agency has arguably given the re-
quester less than the agency possesses. For example, the requester would
not obtain the arrangement of the data which the computer has created,
or is capable of creating. Conversely, agencies should not be allowed to
force requesters to take electronic data. Someone who is not proficient in
using a computer should be able to get the information on paper.169
Agencies could accommodate this need by providing the electronic infor-
mation on a video display device with an attached printer so the requester
could make a copy.17 0 Such a system should not impose a hardship on an
agency because the agency can recoup its cost of the equipment by charg-
ing fees for copies and use of the equipment.'
7 1
Third, the Petroleum decision has not completely resolved the "draft"
document conflict. If an agency contends that its database is still in an
unfinished status, it may avoid release of electronic information if it can
show that compiling the information involves greater judgment calls than
those required in Petroleum to estimate acreage and choose the database
data elements. Also, Petroleum did not overrule Russell. The Russell court's
holding that release of the Sunderland draft would expose the Air Force's
decisionmaking process extended the meaning of the predecisional com-
ponent of the deliberative process privilege too far. Russell leaned danger-
ously toward the proposition that an agency could place any material in a




167. Id. at 323.
168. See generaly Sorokin, supra note 157 (discussing the problems involved in making
computerized records accessible to the public).
169. Perritt, supra note 160, at 229.
170. Id.
171. I. at 232. But see Martin & Merrill v. United States Custom Serv., 657 F. Supp. 733,
734 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that FOIA does not require the United States Custom Service
to invest in costly equipment for public access).
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access it. Yet, Petroleum also introduced a point available to requesters in a
case involving an unfinished computer database. 172 Although the BLM
contended that the unfinished status of the file could lead to public confu-
sion and compromise the final decisions involved in formatting or acces-
sing the file, the agency could alleviate this risk by placing a warning on
the tape or disk released to the requester. 173
Also, even if Congress amended the definition of agency records in
FOIA to include computerized information, as the American Bar Associa-
tion and the Administrative Conference of the United States have recom-
mended,174 issues regarding the scope of the agency's duties to provide
electronic information and to preserve data remain. 17 5 Whether an
agency must provide software or programming to retrieve information
pursuant to a request, and if so who must pay for it, are difficult questions
to answer.1 76 As the Department of Defense argued in American Friends
Service Committee v. United States Department of Defense,t 77 FOIA should not
be interpreted to impose on an agency the burden of developing new
software if that is the only way to comply with a FOIA request.1 78 How-
ever, Judge VanArtsdalen side-stepped that issue. He held only that, be-
cause the Department of Defense would have to take extensive steps
beyond mere deletions to arrive at reasonable segregable unclassified
data, the Department of Defense was not required to utilize or readjust
software to reformulate and produce documents that have never been
agency documents. 179
A request which involves simply copying an existing computer file in-
dex onto a disk is a largely different matter from allowing access to the
computer files' programming codes. A strong argument against allowing
access to the latter is that if a third party developed the software upon
which the records run, and the software is subject to copyright or trade
secret protection, the programming codes may not be disclosed.' 8 0 Also,
FOIA's Exemption 4, which protects proprietary commercial information,
172. See supra note 125 regarding the court's suggestion that Petroleum could have at-
tached a warning to the computer tape.
173. Petroleur, 976 F.2d at 1439.
174. Perritt, supra note 160, at 224 n.123.
175. Id. at 230.
176. Id.; see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 994, 994-96 (1992).
177. No. 83-4916, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8741, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1988).
178. Id at *18-19. See also TPS, Inc. v. Department of Defense, Defense Info. Agency, No.
C-92-4106, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2988 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 1993), where the Department of
Defense, Defense Information Agency, Defense Commercial Communications Office
("DECCO") created an electronic bulletin board system used to advertise to suppliers and
manufacturers. TPS, Inc., an information marketing company, sought under FOIA to obtain
the layout program used to create DECCO's electronic bulletin board. The requested layout
had unique features which could manipulate data files to retrieve certain data. However, the
district court denied TPS's motion for summary judgment and granted DECCO's motion for
summary judgment because TPS failed to provide any specific evidence that DECCO pos-
sessed the layout program. Id. at *10.
179. American Friends Sew. Comm., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8741, at *18.
180. Id.
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may apply to computer programs.1 8 1 Allnet Communications Services,
Inc. recently sued the FCC under FOIA to order the FCC to disclose cost
analysis data prepared for the FCC by various telecommunication compa-
nies.18 2 The cost analysis data was created by the telecommunication com-
panies in connection with the FCC's Open Network Architecture ("ONA")
service rates.18 3 The requested information included output data and ex-
tensive descriptive and instructional materials accompanying the Switch-
ing Cost Information System ("SCIS") computer model submitted to the
FCC by Bell Communications Research, Inc., and participating Bell oper-
ating companies (collectively the "Bell Companies"), intervenors in the
action.18 4 Although Allnet amended its FOIA request to drop its request
for the SCIS software, the court found persuasive the argument that even
without the actual software, the data sought would compromise the confi-
dentiality of the Bell Companies' proprietary information.1 8 5 The FCC
also argued that disclosure of the material sought would impair the effec-
tiveness of its review of unreasonable and discriminatory service rates be-
cause the SCIS models were critical in reviewing these rates.18 6 SCIS
switch vendors indicated that, if the information they provided could be
released under FOIA, they would be hesitant to supply the proprietary
input data which was necessary for the SCIS to function.18 7 If the switch
vendors did not voluntarily supply the Bell Companies with the switch
data, the FCC argued, the ONA program would be impaired.' 8 8 The
court found this possible harm to the ONA as another reason for holding
that the information was exempt under FOIA's Exemption 4.189
Regarding an agency's duty to preserve data, in Armstrong v. Bush,190
litigation which is still ongoing, the D.C. District Court granted a tempo-
rary restraining order to prevent the President, the Executive Office of the
President, and the agency subject to FOTA, the National Security Council,
181. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 50 n.146.
182. Allnet Communication Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 984 (D.D.C. 1992).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 986. An SCIS is a computer model created and used by Bell Communications
Research, Inc. An SCIS allows a user to "estimate future costs of providing specific types of
telecommunications services within a call routing network based on proprietary cost and
engineering data provided by the switch vendors." I. The SCIS is used in connection with
the FCC's ONA policies which mandate that Bell operating companies "unbundle" their ba-
sic regulated telecommunication services. This unbundling procedure was created to maxi-
mize use of the telephone network by providers of unregulated "enhanced services" and to
allow such other providers to compete with the Bell companies. Under the ONA, the Bell
companies must provide customers with optional unbundled features called Basic Service
Elements ("BSEs"). When the Bell companies file requests to raise their rates, and the re-
quests describe new services, the Bell companies must identify the new service's direct costs,
overhead costs and the ratio of-unit cost to unit investment. BSEs reside within electronic
switches that also function in other ways. Thus, the SCIS is needed because of its capacity to
allocate joint and common switching costs and to specify the switching costs of the BSEs in
order to review the rates of the BSEs. I&
185. Id. at 989-90.




190. 807 F. Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1992).
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from erasing any material stored on the "PROFS" electronic mail sys-
tem. 19 1 The plaintiffs, including Armstrong, ajournaist, and citizen pub-
lic interest groups, had sought immediate access under FOIA to PROFS
agency records saved from the last two weeks of the Reagan administra-
tion. 192 The court found that "because history is full of instances where
the outgoing President has decided to... destroy all ... Presidential...
records," the plaintiffs made a showing of "immediate and irreparable
harm." 193 With the rising use of electronic mail, important agency deci-
sions may be found in what appear to be "innocuous" e-mail messages.
194
Although courts may find it difficult to assess the importance of electronic
mail messages and to determine whether the messages are deliberative
and thus exempt under FOIA, the electronic mail messages arguably con-
stitute agency records under FOLA, and the public is entitled to access.
195
CONCLUSION
Petroleum is a bright light at the end of a line of D.C. Circuit cases
which had broadened the application of FOIA's Exemption 5 to the detri-
ment of requesters. The Petroleum court decided that the task of putting
together technical data was not deliberative and also decided that comput-
erized information which was not reasonably accessible in another format
must be disclosed. Even after Petroleum, however, problems remain with
attempting to obtain electronic information under FOIA. Identical infor-
mation in another format which is reasonably accessible may still prevent a
requester from obtaining computerized information under FOIA. Also,
depending on (1) the nature of the documents, (2) whether they contain
recommendations or opinions and (3) whether the process by which the
electronic data is compiled reveals the deliberations of agency employees,
electronic information may still remain nondisclosable. Finally, because
intellectual property rights and FOIA's Exemption 4 may limit the scope
of retrieval of electronic information, agencies may be able to withhold




193. Id. at 820 (citing Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1277-80 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
194. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 38.
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